[Vol.109:224

NOTES
REMOVAL WITHOUT CAUSE OF CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES UNDER AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION

The attainment of some form of job security is a natural and basic goal
in most trades and professions; this desire finds high-level expression in
agreements purporting to bind a corporation or its shareholders to the retention of an officer for a fixed term.' When put to a judicial test, such
agreements have frequently proven worthless. This Note will examine the
subject of removal of executive officers and attempt to answer the following
questions: if a corporation or its shareholders enter into an employment
contract for a fixed term with one who thereby becomes an executive officer,
what is, and what should be, the corporate or shareholder liability, if any,
for the removal of such officer before the natural termination of the
contract?
A number of introductory matters may be dealt with summarily. First,2
no liability is incurred for the removal of an officer for adequate cause,
and the courts, reluctant to question the broad discretion of the board of
directors, will not interfere with the board's "removal for cause" unless
it clearly appears that the action lacked honesty and fair judgment.3
Second, the corporate officer must be distinguished from one who is an
ordinary employee. Contracts of employment with "employees" are more
likely to be enforced than are agreements binding a corporation to the fixed-

I The need

for some assurance of tenure in a new position is most acute when the

individual is offered a position by a corporation in a distant area. See, e.g., the facts
of United Producers & Consumers Co-op. v. Held, 225 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1955). Job
security acts as a protective cushion against the considerable sacrifices involved in
relocation. Many of the same considerations are operative in instances which do not
require transfer out of the state in which the individual resides; indeed, the contract
might
2 be with the corporation with which he has been associated for some time.
Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931) ("An agreement to continue
a man as president is dependent upon his continued loyalty to the interests of the
corporation."). See also McClayton v. W. B. Cassell Co., 66 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md.
1946); Oliphant v. "Home Builders," 34 Cal. App. 720, 168 Pac. 700 (Dist. Ct. App.
1917); Koppitz-Melchers, Inc. v. Koppitz, 315. Mich. 582, 24 N.W.2d 220 (1946);
Smock v. Buchanan & Smock Lumber Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 308, 125 Atl. 115 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1924); Tremsky v. Green, 106 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct 1951); Green Bay Fish
Co. v. Jorgensen, 165 Wis. 548, 163 N.W. 142 (1917). Often the tenure is conditioned
upon the officer remaining faithful, efficient, and competent. See, e.g., Hayden v.
Beane, 293 Mass. 347, 199 N.E. 755 (1936) ; Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E.
641 (1936). See also Meck, Employment of Corporate Executives By Majority
Stockholders, 47 YALE L.J. 1079, 1092 n.32 (1938).
3 Koppitz-Melchers, Inc. v. Koppitz, 315 Mich. 582, 24 N.W.2d 220 (1946); 2
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDrA PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 363, at 176 (rev. ed. 1954). The area
of adequate cause is, of course, difficult to delineate, but the courts tend to be satisfied
with conduct that does not rise to a level of seriousness which could be labelled "mismanagement." The court in McClayton v. W. B. Cassell Co., supra note 2, at 170-71,
remarked that "the position of a managerial officer of a corporation requires mental
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term employment of "officers." -1 Whether or not a given position will be
held to be that of an officer will depend primarily upon corporation statutes
and corporate bylaws.5 Third, removal must ordinarily be by the body
6
authorized to have appointed or elected the officer -that is, the directors
7
or shareholders; therefore, removal of an officer by a superior officer is
ineffective. 8 Fourth, if removal is attempted in violation of the bylaws,
the officer may not quit his office and also recover on the contract; rather,
and temperamental elements consistent with harmonious relations and mutual trust
and confidence on the part of the several managers who must work together." For
an example of what was held to be inadequate cause, see Mansfield v. Lang, 293 Mass.
386, 200 N.E. 110 (1936) (taking pay for overtime, charging rent for own garage,
giving corporate funds to charity, and taking unauthorized six dollars per month
expense money).
4 See Miller v. Vanderlip, 285 N.Y. 116, 33 N.E.2d 51 (1941) ; Munn v. Wellsburg
Banking & Trust Co., 66 W. Va. 204, 66 S.E. 230 (1909) (bookkeeper held to be
employee and not dischargeable without liability).
(9th
5 Compare United Producers & Consumers Co-op. v. Held, 225 F.2d 615
Cir. 1955) (general manager assumed to be an officer), with Miller v. Vanderlip, supra
note 4 (general manager not an officer). Section 44 of the MODEL BusiNxSs Coi'oRATION AcT (1953) provides: "The officers of a corporation shall consist of a president, one or more vice-presidents, as may be prescribed by the by-laws, a secretary,
and a treasurer . ...
6 See Barber v. Win. H. Horstman Co., 295 Pa. 253, 145 Atl. 133 (1929) (per

curiam) ; 2

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDiA PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 357 (rev. ed. 1954).

7The majority of states provide for election by the board of directors. See
ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 36-2A-52 (Supp. 1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-405
(1957) ; CAL. CORP. CODE § 821; Colo. Laws 1958, ch. 32, § 46(a); D. C. CODE ANN.
ANN.
§ 29-919(a) (Supp. 1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.40 (1956); IDAHO ;CODE
IND. ANN.
§ 30-141 (1) (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.43 (Smith-Hurd 1954) GEN.
STAT.
STAT. § 25-209 (1948) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.45 (Supp. 1959) ; KAN.
REv. STAT.
ANN. §17-3106 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. §271.355(1) (1959); LA.
ANN.
§12:35(A) (1950); MIcH. Com'P. LAWS §450.15 (1948); MINN. STAT.§78.130
§301.30(1) (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. §351.360 (1952); NEv. REv. STAT.
(1957) ; N.Y. STocK CORP. LAWS § 60; N.D. REv. CODE § 10-1949 (Supp. 1957) ; OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.64(A) (Page Supp. 1959) ; ORE. Rgv. STAT. § 57.236 (1959);
S.C. CODE § 12-54 (1952); S.D. CODE § 11.0707 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-407
(1955) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 224 (1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-45 (Supp. 1956) ;
STAT.
WASH. REv. CODE § 23.36.060 (1951) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3030 (1955); Wis.
that directors
§ 180.41(1) (1957). The statutes of three other states also provide
by articles
shall elect the officers, but provide further that this method may be replaced
STAT.
or bylaws directing otherwise. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 60 (1957) ; N.C. GEN.
North Carolina
§ 55-34(a) (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-406 (1958).
with
and Pennsylvania have appropriately made provision in their sections dealing
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by
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ANN. tit. 15,
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allows
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E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (1953); NE. REv. STAT. §21-116 (1954);

N.M.

ANN.

§ 51-2-15 (1953).

STAT.
by minority
8Nahikian v. Mattingly, 265 Mich. 128 (1933) (attempted removal
269 App. Div.
shareholders); Morris v. Blume, 55 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct), aff'd,
president). Under no
832, 56 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1945) (attempted removal by corporate
officers. Where an
statute does an officer have authority to elect or appoint other
employment contract,
officer, without implied or apparent authority to enter into an the contract is unenters into such contract and the proper body fails to ratify it,
Cir. 1959).
enforceable. McLaughlin v. Ford Motor Co., 269 F.2d 120 (6th
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he must tender his continued services to the body which appointed or
elected him.9 And finally, the hiring party in the officer's employment agreement may be either the corporation itself or the shareholders; 10 inasmuch
as understandings with stockholders involve considerations somewhat
different from those relevant to corporation agreements," it will be helpful
to examine the two types separately.
AGREEMENTS WITH THE CORPORATION

Damages
The Early Cases
Some of the first cases to test the validity of executive employment
agreements with corporations 12 arose in the states of Washington and West
Virginia, each of which had statutes expressly providing that corporate
officers could be removed by the directors at their pleasure.'8 The courts
in these early cases invalidated employment contracts by mechanistically
applying the rationale that a corporation, being by charter a creature of the
9Birmingham Realty Co. v. Hale, 16 Ala. App. 460 (1918);

Ginter v. Heco

Envelope Co., 316 Ill. 183, 147 N.E. 42 (1925); Keil v. Fred Medart Mfg. Co., 46
S.W.2d 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
10 Often these agreements are reached as a part of a contract for the purchase
or sale of shares. See, e.g., Hayden v. Beane, 293 Mass. 347, 199 N.E. 755 (1936)
(purchase); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918) (sale).
"1 See Leech, Transactionsin Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 787-88
n.181 (1956), where it is suggested that contracts with the corporationmay be treated
differently by the courts than contracts with majority shareholders. One reason why
this is undoubtedly true is that agreements with shareholders are normally found in
instances involving closely held corporations, see text at note 77 infra, and there is a
tendency today to treat closely held corporations differently from publicly held corporations. See Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (Super. Ct. 1953) ;
Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1532-35, 1549
(1960). And see the discussion of the New York development in In the Matter of
Burkin, 286 App. Div. 740, 147 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1955), rev'd, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862,
154 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1958). Also, in the cases involving contracts with a majority of the
shareholders, a second reason for nonenforcement becomes available: the protection
of the interests of noncontracting shareholders and, perhaps, of others. See text
accompanying notes 81-88 infra.
12 The fixed-term contract is the usual type. They have ranged in duration from
one year, e.g., Cuppy v. Stollwerck Bros., 216 N.Y. 591 (1916), to twenty years,
e.g., In re Petrol Terminal Corp., 120 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 1954). Naturally, to be
enforceable, such a contract must be properly executed. McLaughlin v. Ford Motor
Co., 269 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1959). This requirement is fulfilled if the contract is
signed by the board of directors, Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d
636 (3d Cir. 1930), by a duly authorized officer, Nikas v. Hindley, 99 Ga. App. 194,
108 S.E.2d 98 (1959), or by an officer whose act is subsequently approved by a resolution of the directors, Nelson v. Pioneer Specialties, Inc., 325 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 1960 CCH CoRe. L. Gumz 19890 (Tex. Oct. 5,
1960). It has been held that acquiescence by the directors over a period of months
will breathe life into an employment contract made by an officer in excess of his
express authority. Oliver v. Autographic Register Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 72, 177 At.
680 (Ch. 1935), aff'd per curiain, 119 N.J. Eq. 481, 183 Atl. 171 (Ct. Err. & App.
1936) (several years); Fanney v. Virginia Inv. & Mortgage Co., 200 Va. 642, 107
S.E.2d 414 (1959) (sixteen months).
'3 Wash. Laws 1873, § 4(5), at 399 (deleted by WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.36.060 (4)
(1951)); W. Va. Acts 1882, ch. 96, §53 (deleted by W. VA. CODE ANN. §3030
(1955)).
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state, must conform to the rules of its creator. Illustrative is Llewellyn
v. Aberdeen Brewing Co.: 14 plaintiff, under a three-year contract with
the board of directors as assistant manager of defendant corporation, sued
for breach when removed without cause after fourteen months' employment.
The Washington Supreme Court, affirming the lower court's nonsuit, cited
the state statute and declared that if the directors of a corporation could
enter into a three-year contract, a later board would be deprived of the
statutory removal power. The court also stressed the plaintiff's knowledge
that the statute allowed removal at will and that the provision would be
considered a part of the agreement. 15 Four years later, the same courtle
was faced with a case 17 virtually identical except that, in addition to having
the directors' indorsement, the agreement had been approved by unanimous
vote of the stockholders. In view of the rationale expressed in Llewellyn,
this additional fact obviously could make no difference, and the defendant
corporation's successful demurrer in the lower court to an action for damages was affirmed with the statement that "'such officer is bound to know
that he is removable at the pleasure of the board, and that a contract for a
definite period is executed without authority.'" 18
While Washington and West Virginia denied relief to dismissed
executives by relying upon legislation vesting in boards of directors the
power of removal at pleasure, the Texas courts reached the same result
without such a provision. In 1939 the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed
a judgment for the corporate defendant in an action for breach of contract
brought by the corporation's former president; the plaintiff had been engaged for a term of two years and was removed without cause after five
months.' 9 The court, observing that the Texas statute provided for management of the corporate business by the directors 20 and for annual elec14 65 Wash. 319, 118 Pac. 30 (1911).
15 Id. at 321-22, 118 Pac. at 31.
16 Although a different department

17 Murray v. MacIougall & Southwick Co., 88 Wash. 358, 153 Pac. 317 (1915).
's Id. at 360, 153 Pac. at 318. Accord, Long v. United States Say. & Annuity
Co., 76 W. Va. 31, 84 S.E. 1053 (1915) ; Darrah v. Wheeling Ice & Storage Co., 50
W. Va. 417, 40 S.E. 373 (1901).
19
Edwards v. Keller, 133 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). The court assumed,
there was no evidence, that the directors had expressly authorized the conduct.
though
20
TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. art 1327 (Supp. 1960). In light of the general tendency
to allow damages for breach of corporate employment contracts today, it is noteworthy
that forty jurisdictions presently have such a statutory provision: ALA. CODE tit. 10,
§ 21(24) (Supp. 1959); ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 36-2A-41 (Supp. 1958); ARKc.
STAT. ANN. § 64-401 (1957); CAL. CORP. CODE § 800; Colo. Laws 1958, ch. 32,

§ 34,

at 140; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-916
(Supp. VIII, 1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.09(1) (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT.

ch. 32, §157.33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959); IOwA CODE ANN. §496A.34 (Supp.
1959); Ky. Rav. STAT. §271.345(1) (Supp. 1958); LA. REv. STAT. §12:34A
(1950); MD. CODE ANN. art 23, § 52(a) (1957); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 156, §21
(1932) ; Micr. Coup. LAws § 450.13(1) (1948) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28 (1947) ;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.310 (1952) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-111 (1954) ; NEV. REv. STAT.

§ 78.115 (1957); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 294:89 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:7-1

(1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-2-14 (1953); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAWS § 27; N.C. GEN.
STAT.§ 55-24(a) (1960) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 10-1936 (Supp. 1957) ; OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59 (Page Supp. 1959); OR, A. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 1.34 (1953); ORE.
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tions of directors, 21 held that where the terms of a contract extend beyond
the tenure of the directors, thereby taking from the incoming directors "the
2
power of directing the corporate affairs, . . . such contracts are void." 2
And this was true regardless of whether it might be shown that over the
period in question the same members were repeatedly elected and reelected
as directors: "the validity of . . . [the directors'] action is to be deter-

28
mined by legal rules, and not by particular conditions that may exist."
In states having statutes lacking a specific grant to the directors of the
power of removal or the power to manage the corporate affairs, similar
provisions in the bylaws or charter were relied upon in invalidating agreements with officers for fixed terms. Thus, in Fowler v. Great So. Tel. &
Tel. Co.,24 the Louisiana Supreme Court denied recovery of damages for
breach of an employment contract. The court observed that: "[T]he
measure of power vested in the board of directors is determined by the
charter and by-laws, and the board's action in excess thereof is not binding

upon the corporation .

.

.

. It was in the power of the board to remove

him from office at any time, and when they exercised that power all he could
claim in the way of salary was what was due him up to the date of the
acceptance of his resignation." 25
Legislative and Judicial Change
The Fowler-type result, resting upon an oblique conflict of directors'
action with a corporation's own rules, is open to serious question, and this
is particularly so where the bylaws or charter further provides that the
power to alter and amend the bylaws is vested in the directors. In that
event the contract itself, having been executed by the directors, may be
viewed as necessarily amending the bylaw which provided for removal at
any time. Such an amendment theory has been recognized by the Louisiana
Supreme Court 26 and by a federal court 2 7 both of which awarded contract
§ 57.180 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 15, § 2852-401 (1958); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 7-4-6 (1956); S.D. CODE: § 11.0705 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-401
REv. STAT.

(1955) ; Tax. Bus. CORP.ACT art. 2.31A (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-2-21 (1953) ;

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, ch. 258, § 5779 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-35 (1956);
WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.36.010 (Supp. 1955) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3028 (1955) ; Wis.
STAT. § 180.30 (1957) ; Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 17-12 (Supp. 1959).
21 T.x. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.32 (1956).

22133 S.W.2d at 825. Accord, Beaton v. Continental Southland Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 101 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
23
Denton Milling Co. v. Blewett, 254 S.W. 236, 238-39 (Tex. Civ. App.), appeal
dismissed, 114 Tex. 582, 278 S.W. 114 (1923) (per curiam).
Accord, Cohen v. Camden Refrigerating &
24 104 La. 751, 29 So. 271 (1901).
Terminals Co., 129 N.J.L. 519, 30 A.2d 428 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943).
25 104 La. at 752, 29 So. at 272-73.
26 Hill v. American Co-op. Ass'n, 195 La. 590, 197 So. 241 (1940).
27 In Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1930), despite
a bylaw providing for removal at will, plaintiff, removed during his term of five years
as president, was granted contract damages. The court observed: "To read into a
contract of employment for a definite period, expressly authorized by the board of
directors, a by-law amendable by a majority of the board, and thus nullify the contract,
would sacrifice substance and straightforwardness for form and procedure. Defend-
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damages for removal without cause before the natural termination of the
officer's contract despite a bylaw allowing removal at will. But even where
the directors do not have power to amend the bylaws, there is much to be
said for recovery. The absence of conflict with legislative mandates distinguishes the Texas, Washington, and West Virginia cases which so
strictly dogmatized that a contract departing from the express or implied
rules of the state was ipso facto void and unenforceable. Once free from
this line of cases, should the courts deny a corporate executive recovery on
a seemingly valid contract entered into in good faith merely because this
agreement is an indirect infraction-not by him but by the board of directors--of the corporation's rule? In such circumstances, it seems appropriate that the corporation be estopped from raising as a defense to an
otherwise valid contract claim the fact of violation (if it be a violation) by
those representing it. And it is arguable that in the allowance of such
damage claims lies an ultimate corporateadvantage, for the ability to secure
more competent personnel to serve as executives would be complemented
by assurance that the contract will not be meaningless.
In recent years there has been a gradual swing toward the view that
the remedy of damages should be available to the executive having an employment agreement with a corporation which has ousted him without
cause. This shift has resulted in large measure from the widespread
adoption 28 of legislation similar to section 45 of the Model Business Corporation Act,29 which provides: "Any officer or agent may be removed by
ant's further contention that, if the contract be upheld at the expense of the by-law,
boards of directors may by contract of employment for terms of years perpetuate their
business policy and deprive succeeding boards of the power to afford relief, is not
convincing. It sticks in the bark, for the evil possibilities suggested have their true
foundation, not in the supremacy of contract over by-law, but in the futility of a
limitation which rests solely upon a by-law amendable by a majority of the board.
Were there doubt of the board's power to amend by necessary implication through
solemnly authorized, inconsistent acts, the limitation would constitute no barrier to the
commission of the suggested acts by a board so disposed, for the board could formally
and expressly repeal the by-law containing the limitation and thereupon with all
authorize the contracts for terms of years." Id. at 639.
regularity
28
ALAsA ComP. LAws ANN. § 36-2A-53 (Supp. 1958); Colo. Laws 1958, ch.
32, § 47; CONN. GEN. STAT. Ray. § 33-319(b) (Supp. 1959) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-919a
(Supp. VIII, 1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.44 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959);
IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.46 (Supp. 1959) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.355(4) (Supp. 1959) ;
LA. REV. STAT. § 12:35D (1950) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 61 (1957) ; MICH. CoMP.
LAws § 450.15 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.30(3) (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§351.36 (1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-34(d) (1960); N.D. REv. CODE § 10-1950

(Supp. 1957); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.64(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1959); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.44 (1953) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.241 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 2852-407 (1958) ; TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT art 2.43A (1956); VA. CODE ANN.
§13.1-46 (1956); WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.36.060(4) (Supp. 1955); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.42 (1957). In New York and Vermont the corporate statutes provide merely
that officers may be removed at the pleasure of the board of directors. N.Y. STOCK
See note 37 infra. The
CORP. LAws § 60; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 224 (1958).
only other state statutes having provisions regarding removal are UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 16-2-27 (1953), and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3032 (1955), both expressly leaving the
matter to be determined by the bylaws; and DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 142(e) (1953),
and NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-118 (1954), which provide for the filling of vacancies
occurring as a result of removal but are otherwise silent on the subject.
29

MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT

§ 45 (1953).
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the board of directors, or by the executive committee, if any, whenever in
its judgment the best interests of the corporation will be served thereby, but
such removal shall be without prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the
person so removed. Election or appointment of an officer or agent shall
not of itself create contract rights." 30 On the basis of this new statute,
the Supreme Court of Washington 31 distinguished earlier cases and held
that the directors' use of the statutory power to remove corporate officers
does not disturb the ex-officer's contract rights. Similarly, in 1960 Texas
indicated that it would allow recovery of damages for breach of a contract
whereby plaintiff was employed for two years as president of defendant
corporation and removed without cause after only four months, provided
that the contract be not prohibited by the charter or bylaws. 32 It was
conceded that, in view of the 1951 amendment to the corporate law,33 state
policy no longer prohibited corporations through their directors from
entering into contracts of employment for such periods of time as they
might wish.
With the advent of these later cases 34 and statutory changes,3 Washington, West Virginia, Texas, and Louisiana have adopted what has come
to be the majority view: 36 that, regardless of statutory provisions sanctioning at-pleasure removal 37 and with the exception of those cases involving
express prohibitions in charters or bylaws, 38 a corporate executive employment agreement for a fixed term will give rise to an action for contract
damages in the event of removal without cause prior to the expiration of the
term. 39 Certainly, such a rule is reasonable: in these times of rapid expansion of industry and equally rapid contraction of national boundaries
through improved transportation, corporations are more likely to look out30
This last sentence was added in 1953 and has thus far been included in the
statutes of Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
31
Hansen v. Columbia Breweries, Inc., 12 Wash. 2d 554, 122 P.2d 489 (1942).
32
See Pioneer Specialties, Inc. v. Nelson, 1960 CCH Coas. L. GUmE 9890
(Tex. Oct. 5, 1960). The court held, however, that a bylaw prohibited the directors
from entering into contracts for periods longer than one year. Compare the lower
court opinion, 325 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
33

TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 1327 (Supp. 1960).

earlier cases have recently been referred to as "stale authorities" in United
Producers & Consumers Co-op. v. Held, 225 F.2d 615, 617 (9th Cir. 1955).
35 See discussion of current statutes at notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
36 United Producers & Consumers Co-op. v. Held, 225 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1955) ;
Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1930); I1 re Paramount Publix Corp., 15 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), aff'd, 90 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.
1937) ; Nikas v. Hindley, 99 Ga. App. 194, 108 S.E.2d 98 (1959).
37 This majority includes the New York case of Cuppy v. Stollwerck Bros., 216
N.Y. 591, 111 N.E. 249 (1916). The New York statute then provided and still provides that officers may be removed "at pleasure" of the directors. N.Y. STocK Cop.
LAws § 60. See In re Paramount Publix Corp., mupra note 36, at 466.
38 See, e.g., TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 1327 (Supp. 1960); Pioneer Specialties,
9890 (Tex. Oct. 5, 1960); Nikas v.
Inc. v. Nelson, 1960 CCH Cone. L. GUIDE
Hindley, 99 Ga. App. 194, 199-200, 108 S.E.2d 98, 102 (1959). Where directors have
the power to amend the bylaws, the contract should be upheld despite a prohibitive
bylaw. See text preceding note 26 supra.
39
Accord, England. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson & Sons, [1913] 2 K.B. 471.
34 The
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side their immediate geographical area in search of high-level executive
manpower, and the individual is more likely to consider relocation. When
a corporation finds the man for an executive position, it will wish to offer
the most attractive position possible. On his part, the individual will desire
an assurance of security prior to relocation. The result is negotiation
culminating in a contract presuming to guarantee some degree of tenure.
This is, in reality, a positive exercise by the directors of their power to
manage the corporation 4 0 -the power inviolate which the early courts
sought to protect by invalidating such contracts. The worst that can be
said of fixed-term contracts is that they give rise to the possibility of corporate liability in the event that succeeding boards would prefer to abolish
the position or to hire someone else to fill it.41 But to uphold in an action
for damages the validity of an agreement made for a reasonable length of
time results at most in a loss of a few times the annual salary. The directors take this same risk when they enter into a long-term lease.42 These
corporate considerations-in addition to the inequity and actual injury
inherent in removal without relief that fall upon the officer at the opposite
end of the bargain-afford ample reason for allowing executive employment
agreements to support an action for damages. And in most instances this
is the law today.
Reasonableness
However, judicial opinion indicates that this modem rule is not to be
automatically applied whenever a case involving a fixed-term executive
employment contract arises. The court in Realty Acceptance Corp. v.
Montgomery,43 granting damages for breach of contract, stated:
Nor was the contract one against public policy . . . . the restraint
thereby placed upon the future freedom . . . of defendant's board
of directors cannot be said to have been in fact or principle injurious
to the public interest. The term of office therein fixed was neither
permanent, unlimited nor for life, but, in view of plaintiff's relation
to defendant and his familiarity and grasp of its business, was for a
44
reasonable period only.
The court did not say that no contract for a fixed term is against public
policy or injurious to the public interest; it merely stated that this contract
See note 20 supra.
The likelihood of the present board removing the officer without cause is somewhat remote, if good faith in the negotiations is posited.
42
This point was made in Hansen v. Columbia Breweries, Inc., 12 Wash. 2d 554,
560, 122 P.2d 489, 491-92 (1942).
Observing that natural persons can make longterm contracts, the court found further support in a provision of the corporate law
stating that corporations have the "capacity to act possessed by natural persons.'
Id. at 559, 122 P.2d at 491. See also In re Paramount Publix Corp., 90 F.2d 441, 445
(2d Cir. 1937).
43 51 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1930).
40

41

44 Id. at 639. The opinion does not elaborate on what plaintiff's "relation" to the
defendant was, other than that of a "past"' president.

232

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.109:224

was not in that class and proceeded to give the reasons therefor. Similarly,
in 1955 the Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court judgment awarding damages
to plaintiff for breach of a contract under which defendant corporation
45
had employed plaintiff for a period of three years as general manager.
The court observed that "the members of the boards of the appellant corporations were elected for staggered three year terms. The contract made
with appellee was for a period of three years." Under these facts the court
found "no sound reason to repudiate the conclusion that the contract in the
case at bar was made for a reasonable time and is therefore valid." 4' Thus
there is a limit of reasonableness superimposed on the majority rule. And
what is an unreasonably lengthy contract will depend upon myriad circumstances, including the experience of the officer, 47 the term of office, 48
the length of the fixed period,49 the term for which directors are elected,5 0
the salary (in that it will determine the extent of damages in the event
of removal by the directors), 5' the position,52 and the nature of the corporation (in that a corporation with high net profits could more easily
withstand large contract damages). The cases discussed above are representative of contracts within the allowable sphere but contracts falling
beyond the line of enforceability can easily be envisioned: for instance, an
agreement attempting to bind the corporation for the life of the officer, or
a contract for one year with a twelve-year-old boy for the position of
53
secretary.
Specific Enforcement
The fixed-term executive employment contract of reasonable length is
today quite capable of supporting a damage action for its breach; however,
the courts are not persuaded that specific enforcement of such contracts is
a proper remedy.5 4 But while reluctance to grant specific performance
45

United Producers & Consumers Co-op. v. Held, 225 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1955).
The defendant corporation had a bylaw providing that the manager "shall hold office
at the pleasure of and upon terms and conditions fixed by the Board of Directors."
at 617.
46
Id. at 620. (Emphasis added.)
47 See text at note 44 supra.
48

Id.

Ibid.

49 Ibid.

Such contracts for periods as long as five years were held enforceable
in actions for breach in Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 51 F.2d 636 (3d
Cir. 1930) ; Nikas v. Hindley, 99 Ga. App. 194, 108 S.E.2d 98 (1959). See also discussion of the Staklinski case (a 1959 decision which enforced an arbitration award of
specific performance of a contract for eleven years) at notes 58-72 infra.
50 Ibid.
51 But note that a discharged officer is under an obligation to mitigate damages
by making reasonable efforts to gain employment elsewhere. See Hansen v. Columbia
Breweries, Inc., 12 Wash. 2d 554, 562-63, 122 P.2d 489, 492-93 (1942) (dictum).
52 Obviously, a secretary is less likely to interfere with the board's vested power
of management than is the president, and thus is correspondingly less likely to provoke
attempts at removal.
53 See Meck, Employment of Corporate Executives by Majority Stockholders, 47
YALE L.J. 1079, 1094 & n.34 (1938).
54 See Frank v. Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136, 138-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) : "If
[the removed president's] . . . contract of employment as president was breached by
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exists-indeed, at least one state statute forbids it,55 arbitrators upon occasion have decreed specific performance of employment contracts brought
before them. 5 6 In the past, these awards were granted and upheld by the
57
courts in instances involving an "employee" rather than an "officer."
8
The first instance in which an arbitration order of specific performance 5
of an officer's employment contract with a corporation was judicially
59
enforced was the recent New York case, In the Matter of Staklinski.

There, petitioner Staklinsli, under a written contract of employment for
eleven years as manager of defendant corporation at a salary of $40,000
his removal, he has an appropriate remedy by an action for damages thereon." Williston gives two other reasons for denial of specific performance: "(1) Long and minute
supervision might be needed to secure the proper execution of the decree; (2) the
proper performance of the services to the best of the defendant's ability is uncertain and
difficult to gauge." Williston adds that "any attempt to overcome these difficulties might
involve too serious an infringement of personal liberty to be tolerable." WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1423A, at 3983 (rev. ed. 1937). See also 1 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 519, at 651 (1959); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 379 (1932).
However, a writ of mandamus will issue to compel reinstatement where the removal
is clearly in violation of the bylaws, charter, or statute-e.g., where less than the
required number of directors voted for removal; but even then the writ will issue
only if necessary to prevent "injustice or great injury." State ex rel. Blackwood v.
Brast, 98 W. Va. 596, 127 S.E. 507 (1925) (dictum). See also Morris v. Blume, 55
N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 269 App. Div. 832, 56 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1945), which
held that plaintiff, under contract of employment for a stated salary "until the board
of directors otherwise direct," could enjoin the corporation president from interfering
with the performance of his duties and withholding his salary. See generally note 8
supra. But see In the Matter of Allied Fruit & Extract Co., 243 App. Div. 52, 276
N.Y. Supp. 153 (1934), which suggests that in membership corporations mandamus is
the proper proceeding to determine right to reinstatement. Ordinarily mandamus will
not lie to try title to a disputed corporate office. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 366, at 184 (rev. ed. 1954). In such a case the removed officer may
seek quo warranto proceedings. Tonkin v. Kenworthy, 112 N.J.L. 274, 170 Atl. 233
(Sup. Ct. 1934) ; State ex rel. Walker v. Maas, 4 N.J. Misc. 230, 132 Atl. 322 (Sup.
Ct. 1926).
55
E.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 3390.
56 See, e.g., In the Matter of Ruppert, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d
785 (1958).
57
E.g., In the Matter of Ruppert, .mpranote 56; In the Matter of Devery, 292
N.Y. 596, 55 N.E.2d 370 (1944).
58 Such a result, of course, gives rise to the possibility that a court may be called
upon to enforce an award that would not have been granted had the case originated
before the court. In New York it is provided that either party may enforce a contractual agreement to submit disputes to arbitration. N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. ACT § 1450.
Eighteen states now have statutes similar to that of New York. See 34 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 961, 962 n.9 (1959). And New York limits defenses available to the defendant
in resisting an action to confirm an award. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§ 1461-62, 1462(a).
However, it is significant to note that even the New York courts have on occasion
departed from the strict legislative command and vacated, modified, or corrected
awards on grounds of public policy. E.g., In the Matter of Publishers' Ass'n, 280
App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952). See 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 961, 963 (1959).
Some state statutes provide that courts called upon to enforce arbitration awards shall
retain equitable jurisdiction. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1941);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 417.018 (Supp. 1959) ; Mica. ComP. LAwS § 645.12 (1948) ; MISS.
CODE ANN. § 297 (1956) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-506 (1957) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5502
(1955). Presumably this would allow them to determine the propriety of awards of
specific performance. Courts have indicated that the same result would be reached
in the absence of a statute.

See, e.g., Goldstein v. International Ladies' Garment

Workers' Union, 328 Pa. 385, 394, 196 AtI. 43, 47-48 (1938) ; 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 961,

962-63 (1959).

59 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959), aflrining 6 App. Div.
2d 565, 180 N.Y.S.2d 20, affirming 10 Misc. 2d 706, 172 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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per year, was discharged after two years by the board of directors, who
acted under a section of the contract providing that if Staklinski were
unable for a period of three months to perform his duties in a substantial
manner, the board would then meet to determine the nature of the disability. If permanent rather than temporary disability were found, the
corporation was to be excused from contract liability.60 The contract
further stated that "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in
accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration
Association." 61 Pursuant to the latter provision, petitioner sought arbitration. A majority of the arbitrators upheld his contention that he was not
permanently disabled and that the action of the board of directors was an
abuse of their discretion. Staldinski was ordered reinstated, and the company appealed.
In dismissing the appeal, the supreme court held that the arbitrators'
award was binding and that "the fact that our courts, were petitioner the
plaintiff in an action, would not grant specific performance does not necessarily deprive arbitrators of the right to grant such relief, especially where
the parties have expressly agreed that they might do so." 62 As to respondent's contention that specific performance was against public policy,
the court said:
It is true that it does not seem desirable that a company, especially
a publicly owned corporation, should be compelled, instead of paying
damages, to restore a person to an important managerial position for
the balance of a long term contract, despite the judgment of its Board
of Directors that he is permanently disabled. The reasoning of . .
3....3
[Ruppert] appears, however, to require this undesirable result .
The appellate division, affirming three-to-two, had this to say:
This cannot be termed such interference with the corporate management by its Board of Directors as to constitute a violation of the statutes applicable. Cases are legion upholding the right and power of a
corporation by its Board of Directors or other proper person to enter
or authorize contracts of employment for extended terms. If entered
in good faith, in accordance with existing law, the charter and bylaws of the corporation, such contracts are valid .

.

.

. Just as the

applicable statutes defining the powers and duties of directors of
corporations . . . are not limitations on the corporate powers to
60 10 Misc. 2d at 707-08, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 226.

61 Ibid. One of the rules then obtaining was that the arbitrator "may grant any
remedy or relief which he deems just and equitable . . . including . . . specific

performance of a contract." Id. at 708, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
62 10 Misc. 2d at 709, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
63 10 Misc. 2d at 711, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 228-29. But the cases cited all dealt with
"employee" as opposed to "officer" contracts. See notes 4 and 5 supra and accompanying text.
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make binding contracts of employment for extended terms, so the
provisions for arbitration of disputes relating to such employment and
the awards that may result do not offend the statutory purport. Nor
does the provision for arbitration or any award made thereunder
deprive the corporate board of its power to discharge its duties with
respect to the corporate affairs, albeit like any contract it thereafter
narrows the choices open to the corporation.
It must be remembered that the statute [vesting management of
corporate business in the board of directors] 6 does not establish an
absolute or universal norm from which there can be no variation ....
It becomes apparent then that the distinction here, if any, must be
because of the job level, for, as pointed out, employment contracts as
such, and awards thereunder directing reinstatement, have been
upheld. 65
And the court of appeals also affirmed, emphasizing in its brief opinion that
the corporation made a valid contract in which it agreed to arbitrate disputes. "Since the contract was indisputably valid, so is the arbitration
award."

06

Does Staklinski extend too far the rights of corporate officers under an
employment contract? The extension can not be appropriately attacked
on the equity grounds that the officer has an adequate remedy at law, for the
contracting parties have agreed to an arbitration which by its terms expresses a desire for more than the usual relief. And the corporation's
acquiescence in the availability of specific performance considerably weakens
the argument that the award violates public policy. To be sure, there are
undesirable effects inherent in compelling a business to accept the services
of a high-ranking executive whom the directors consider a corporate liability, but the possibility of judicial effectuation of this result is traceable
to the complaining company. Specific enforcement in this instance is not a
remedy so foreign and harsh as to be judicially intolerable despite agree67
ment by all parties as to its availability.
Granting the reasonableness of the case when attention is focused on
the above inquiries, Staklinski raises a further consideration which the
New York courts facilely glossed over: the reconciliation of the result with
section 60 of the Stock Corporation Act, which provides, inter alia, that
§ 27.
65 6 App. Div. 2d at 568-69, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 25-26. Valente, J., dissented: "the
statutory machinery for the enforcement of arbitration awards contemplates the
exercise of a judicial function and not a ministerial one. No judgment should issue
from the court which contravenes deeply ingrained principles and rules of equity
jurisprudence regarding the specific performance of contracts for personal service."
Id. at 572, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
66 6 N.Y.2d at 163, 160 N.E.2d at 79, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
67 For an example of a court's refusal to enforce a remedy which it did find
judicially intolerable, see In the Matter of Publishers' Ass'n, 280 App. Div. 500, 114
N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952).
64 N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAWS
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the directors "may remove [an officer] at pleasure." 68 The appellate division was the only court to mention the section, and it merely asserted that
the relation of the arbitration provisions to the statute was like that of fixedterm contracts of employment generally-neither offended the legislative
language. 69 The assertion cannot stand: while in the damage cases the
indirect conflict may be resolved by allowing both removal without cause
and damages for such removal, 70 a direct clash with the statutory provision
is unavoidable where an arbitration agreement sanctions specific performance. Such an award nullifies the power granted by section 60,
which gives legislative force to the policy argument of protecting the
corporation against itself. This provision and similar statutes 71 mean
little if they do not protect the freedom of directors to act at all times in the
manner which they believe will further the best interests of the corporation.
This statutory policy of independent exercise of judgment by the board
or its successors should not be negated by an agreement to arbitrate, as it
was in Staklinski.7 2
AGREEMENTS WITH THE SHAREHOLDERS

A person negotiating for an executive position might prefer for a
number of reasons to contract directly with the shareholders rather than
with the corporation through its board of directors.7 8 The contract might
provide that the officer is to serve concurrently as a director; 74 in such a
case, the directors would generally be unable to bind the corporation to the
retention of a fellow director.7 5 Or the prospective officer may believe-

§ 60.
69 6 App. Div. 2d at 568, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
70 See notes 34-42 supra and accompanying text.
7
1 For the states having statutory provisions substantially identical to § 60, see
note 28 supra. This argument would also appear to be available in connection with
statutes vesting the power to manage the corporation in the board of directors. See
note 720
supra.
2
Although this reasoning does not appear to fall within any of the exclusive
grounds for vacation or modification of awards set out in N.Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT §§ 1462,
1462a, the New York courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, see In the
Matter of Lipschutz, 304 N.Y. 58, 63-64, 106 N.E.2d 8 (1952), have vacated or corrected awards on other grounds. See In the Matter of Publishers' Ass'n, 280 App.
Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952). Support for vacation of the award may be found
in Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, CIO, 299 N.Y. 177,
86 N.E.2d 162 (1949) (alternative holding) (arbitration contract provision as construed below violated penal statute; vacation of award affirmed).
73 See generally Meck, supra note 53, at 1080-82. The majority stockholder
agreement is not merely an alternative; it may be supplementary to a contract with
the corporation, thus giving the officer "two strings to his bow." Id. at 1082.
74
E.g., Tremsky v. Green, 106 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Such a provision
is much more likely to be found in a contract involving a closely held corporation.
75 Directors are generally elected by the stockholders.
See, e.g., N.Y. STocK
CORP. LAW § 55; 2 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 285 (rev. ed.
1954); HORNSTEIN, CORORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 351 (1959). In a converse
context, while cases will be found holding that the board of directors may remove
fellow directors, see Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931), the weight of
authority is against the proposition. See Stott v. Realty Co., 246 Mich. 267, 224
N.W. 623 (1929). See also HORNSTEIN, op. cit. supra § 389, at 521.
68 N.Y. STOCK Coar. LAws
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perhaps with justification-that the shareholders -will be more concerned
over possible personal liability than will be the corporation over corporate
liability. Or having bargained with the controlling shareholder, the officer
may find a contract with that person to be the most natural culmination of
the negotiations. 7 Although there is no reason other than practicability why such a contract could not be executed with a public corporation,
shareholder-officer contracts will normally be found where the company
77
involved is closely held.
Damages

As a general rule, it is held today that where all of the shareholders
are parties to a contract to employ a person as an executive officer, the
contract will give rise to an action for damages for its breach if the officer
is removed without cause 78 before the natural termination of the contract." 9
But where less than all of the shareholders are parties, the agreements are
usually invalidated. 0 This distinction most often rests upon a rationale
seldom articulated in cases involving contracts with the corporation: 81 that
the interests of noncontracting parties must be protected.
Thus, in 1899 in the only removal-of-officer case 8 2 to reach the United
States Supreme Court, the Court held unenforceable a contract wherein
defendant, the holder of five-sixths of a corporation's stock, agreed to use
his influence as corporate president and controlling stockholder to retain
76

See, e.g., Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486 (1897), involving a con-

tract with Joseph Pulitzer, whose iron hand had such control of the St. Louis PostDispatch as to be, in reality, the corporation.
77 See West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1889) ; Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24,
64 N.E.2d 439 (1946); Hayden v. Beane, 293 Mass. 347, 199 N.E. 755 (1936);
Scripps v. Sweeney, 160 Mich. 148, 125 N.W. 72 (1910) ; Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1,
39 S.W. 486 (1897); In the Matter of Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862, 154
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) ; McQuade
v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175
N.E. 516 (1931); Rochester v. Bergen, 265 App. Div. 547, 39 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1943) ;
Heller v. Clark Merchandisers, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 106, 154 N.Y.S.2d 150 (Sup. Ct.
1955) ; Dubbs v. Kramer, 302 Pa. 455, 153 At. 733 (1931) ; Baran v. Baran, 59 Pa.
D. & C. 556 (C.P. 1947) ; Roberts v. San Jacinto Shipbuilders, 198 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947).
78 What has been said concerning removal with cause, see notes 2-3 supra and
accompanying text, is equally true when the contract in question is made with the
shareholders: removal with cause does not give rise to contract liability. See, e.g.,
Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 72-73, 175 N.E. 516, 517 (1931); Tremsky v. Green,
106 7N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
9 E.g., Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ill. 589, 73 N.E. 874 (1905) ; Hayden v. Beane,
293 Mass. 347, 199 N.E. 755 (1936) ; cf. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641

(1936).

so E.g., Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d 439 (1946). Contra, Lockley
v. Robie, 301 N.Y. 371, 93 N.E.2d 895 (1950).
81 See text following note 13 supra for the usual reasoning behind invalidation.
But note that the possible-injury rationale is in fact the basis for failure to enforce
officer-corporation contracts. There, it is argued, public policy compels the corporation, by its charter the creature of the state, to conform to the rules of its creator,
one of which vests management in the board of directors or, more specifically, gives
the directors power to remove officers at will. And the legislative aim in placing this
power of management in the directors-a body held to the standards of fiduciaries-is
to protect shareholders, creditors, and perhaps even consumers (for example, depositors in banks). See Meck, supra note 53, at 1085-86.
82West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1889).
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plaintiff in the office of vice president and general manager. A unanimous
Court found that "the agreement alleged to have been made was one on the
part of the defendant whereby he might be required to act contrary to the
duty which, as an officer of the . . . [corporation], he owed to that company and to the stockholders other than the plaintiff." 83 New York preferred to invalidate such contracts on grounds reminiscent of the early cases
dealing with agreements with corporations: 84 that they stifled the directors'
managerial power. In McQuade v. Stoneham,8 5 plaintiff sued for damages
for breach of a contract with defendant, majority shareholder in and a
director of the New York Giants, whereby plaintiff became treasurer of
the corporation and defendant promised his best efforts to retain plaintiff
in that capacity. McQuade was removed without cause; the court of
appeals reversed an award of damages, stating that "directors may not by
agreements entered into as stockholders abrogate their independent judgment [in electing officers]." 8 More recently the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court denied enforcement of a contract entered into by all but
one of the corporation's shareholders.8 7 The contract provided that plaintiff was to be employed as clerk, vice president, and assistant treasurer as
long as the parties were affiliated with the company. The court held that
inasmuch as the one nonparticipating stockholder might be injured by it,
8
the contract was void as against public policy.
Reversing the reasoning used to strike down contracts with majority
shareholders on the basis of potential injury to noncontracting parties, the
New York Court of Appeals in Clark v. Dodges " upheld a contract
entered into by all of the stockholders. Although the court paid its respects
to the McQuade rule against limitation of the directors' power by stating
that "there was no attempt to sterilize the board of directors," 90 its emphasis was placed on the lack of injury to other interests: "Possible harm to
bona fide purchasers of stock or to creditors or to stockholding minorities
have more substance [than policy arguments] ; but such harms are absent
in many instances. If the enforcement of a particular contract damages
nobody-not even, in any perceptible degree, the public--one sees no reason for holding it illegal .... " 91
In the same year, 1936, Massachusetts held that a complaint alleging
breach of an employment contract entered into by all of the shareholders
83

Id.at 520. (Emphasis added.)
84 See notes 13 and 81 supra and accompanying text.
85263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
8
6Id.at 328-29, 189 N.E. at 236.
87 Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d 439 (1946).
88
Id.at 25, 64 N.E.2d at 440.
89269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). Plaintiff and defendant were the corpoonly stockholders, holding 25% and 75% respectively.
ration's
90
Id. at 415, 199 N.E. at 643. Earlier in its opinion, the court noted that it was
admitted that the contract impinged the board's power slightly. Id. at 417, 199 N.E.
at 642.
91 Id.at 415, 199 N.E. at 642.
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stated a cause of action. 2 In return for plaintiff's agreement to serve
as general manager for at least seven years, the defendant shareholders
were to transfer twenty-four shares to him, to elect plaintiff and any additional person selected by him to the board of directors, to vote to insure
a board favorable to plaintiff, and not to sell any shares without first offering them to plaintiff. Despite the obvious limitations the agreement would
place on the board of directors' power to manage the corporation, the court
rejected the public policy attack 93 and stated that the contract was apparently a good faith agreement, entered into for the purpose of benefit to the
corporation and all of the stockholders. 94
In a close corporation, it is almost certain that the shareholders will
also be directors or at least have personal control over those who are.95
Thus, when all of the shareholders are signatories to an executive employment agreement, it is difficult to argue that the directors' discretion is unreasonably hampered by the contract. It is even more difficult to contend
that the shareholders should be protected from such a contract-they have
by their action disqualified themselves from any protection the court might
extend to unrepresented interests. But where less than all of the shareholders
sign, it is appropriate that the court scrutinize the contract and inquire as
to the possibility of harm to noncontracting stockholders; this inquiry is
especially warranted in the usual case of the closely held corporation.
Looking only at the direct harm to which the obligations of the contract
might subject the corporation, such harm, if any, will be found in the
excessive size of the salary offered or control given to the individual; this
type of injury can be effectively controlled, however, by requiring good
faith and reasonableness 96 at the time the majority shareholders enter into
the agreement. The contract itself need not necessarily directly conflict
with the removal and managerial powers of the director-shareholders, for
the duties imposed on the corporation may not "sterilize the directorate." 97
92 Hayden v. Beane, 293 Mass. 347, 199 N.E. 755 (1936).
Accord, Kantzler v.
Bensinger, 214 I1. 589, 73 N.E. 874 (1905); Cohen v. Wacht, 124 N.Y.S.2d 207
(Sup. Ct), aff'd per curiam, 282 App. Div. 1054, 126 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1953); cf.
Martocci v. Martocci, 2 Misc. 2d 330, 42 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam,
266 App. Div. 840, 43 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1943).
93 But cf. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
94 293 Mass. at 351, 199 N.E. at 756-57. But see Roberts v. San Jacinto Shipbuilders, 198 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), where the court disallowed recovery of
damages for breach of contract in which defendant, who was director and president,
and his family "owned or controlled all or practically all of the capital stock." Id.
at 489. It was held that a contract which binds a director to elect an officer to a year's
employment is void as against public policy because a corporation is entitled to a
director's vote and judgment at all directors' meetings, uninfluenced by any prior
commitments or agreements. Id. at 491.
95 Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1532,
1533-34 (1960) ; Meck, supra note 53, at 1082-84.
96 See notes 43-53 supra and accompanying text.
97 See Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 417, 199 N.E. 641, 643 (1936) (stating that
a contract with all the shareholders did not sterilize the directors) ; Fells v. Katz,
256 N.Y. 67, 72, 175 N.E. 516, 517 (1931); Martocci v. Martocci, 2 Misc. 2d 330,
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But more serious questions arise when the indirect effect of the agreement upon the corporation is considered. Inasmuch as liability upon breach
is not that of the corporation but rather that of the contracting stockholders,
the director-shareholders (or the directors controlled by the majority shareholders) may be reluctant to risk personal liability, even though the corporate interest might call for the officer's removal. But granting the possibility of this failure to act in the best interests of the corporation and even
acknowledging the deleterious effects upon minority shareholder interests
which may stem therefrom, the question remains whether these effects are
serious enough to require that the removed officer be deprived of any
remedy whatsoever by a judicial declaration of unenforceability of his employment contract. The discharged officer's injury is immediate loss of his
job, whereas the derogatory effect upon minority shareholders is indirect,
somewhat diffused, and difficult to ascertain or measure. So long as the
officer's conduct does not rise to the level at which he might be discharged
for cause, it is doubtful that the corporate damage will be substantial. Nor
is the corporation put in a position of having no choice of action, as it is
when arbitration awards granting specific performance are enforced; the
statutory power of removal is not infringed. And underlying the entire
theoretical structure on which denial of damages is based is a possibly
fallacious assumption: it cannot be concluded as a matter of actual practice
that the majority shareholder-directors will generally act against the corporate interest, for their personal interest substantially coincides with that
of the company in a close corporation.
The issue thus resolves itself to whether prevention of the tangential
and possible injury to minority stockholders should be favored over the
avoidance of the immediate and serious consequences which fall to the
officer removed without cause. The considerations discussed above suggest
the granting of damages for breach of reasonable employment contracts with
stockholders, whether the agreement be with the entire group or with the
majority only."
Specific Performance
In the classic New York case of Fells v. Katz,99 plaintiff, having contracted with five shareholders 10 0 of a corporation to serve as president for
ten years, sued to compel reinstatement after having been removed by the
333, 42 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 266 App. Div. 840, 43 N.Y.S.2d
516 (1943). The shibboleth originated and was aptly used to describe the effect of
the contract in Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 323, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918).
98 Although the New York Court of Appeals apparently viewed majority shareholder employment contracts as valid in themselves in 1918, Manson v. Curtis, 223
N.Y. 313, 319-20, 119 N.E. 559, 561 (1918) (dictum), this view was negated in
McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934). However, Judge Lehman's concurrence in McQuade, id. at 333, 189 N.E. at 238, kept the thought alive,
and a divided court of appeals has recently restored the contract to an enforceable
status, unfortunately without discussion of the problems or of the contrary authorities.
Lockley v. Robie, 301 N.Y. 371, 93 N.E.2d 895, modifying 276 App. Div. 291, 94
N.Y.S.2d 335 (1950) (specific performance granted).
99 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931).
100 All five shareholders were also directors.
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directors. The supreme court dismissed the bill and the appellate division
affirmed. The court of appeals, citing the statutory provision vesting
management of the corporate affairs in the directors, 10 1 also affirmed:
[the directors'] conduct in the
The courts will not regulate . .
reasonable exercise and performance of their duty, even though they
may by such conduct render the corporation liable to actions for damages for unlawful discharge. An agreement among stockholders
whereby the directors are bereft of their power to discharge an un10 2
faithful employee of the corporation is illegal as against public policy.
While there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that removal was
for "cause," 103 and although the opinion speaks of the power to remove
"unfaithful" employees, the court's unwillingness to interfere, "even though
. . . [the directors] may by such conduct render the corporation liable
to actions for damages," indicates hesitancy specifically to enforce the contract even in the absence of cause. In 1943, in a case 104 not involving any
question of removal for cause, the New York Appellate Division denied
specific performance of a contract between the president and holders of
most, though not all, of the stock of a close corporation. The court observed that "the directors of a corporation may not thus fetter in advance
their discretion as to the selection and maintenance in office of the officers
of a corporation," 105 but what seemed in fact crucial to the decision was
that plaintiff failed to establish his contention that all of the stockholders
had consented to his long term of office.10 6 On the other hand, where all
shareholders have entered into the contract, the courts have generally been
willing to grant specific performance; 107 indeed, New York has recently
extended this rule of enforcement to a case ' 08 in which the employment
contract was agreed to by a majority of the stockholders only.
101 N.Y.
102

GEN. CoRp. LAWS § 27.
256 N.Y. at 72, 175 N.E. at 517.

103 Plaintiff was simultaneously organizing a business which potentially offered
competition to the corporation from which he was removed.
104 Rochester v. Bergen, 265 App. Div. 547, 39 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1943) (per curiam).
1 05
Id. at 548, 39 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
106 It is interesting to note that the court does not say that all shareholders did not
sign but rather that all did not consent. The New York court had previously considered, at the pleading stage, a case in which all the shareholders had been parties to
the contract. In Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936), it affirmed a
lower court order denying dismissal of a complaint in an action seeking specific
enforcement. The action arose, not as a result of removal by the directors but
rather, as is often the case, upon the failure of the shareholders to vote as agreed.
See Baran v. Baran, 59 Pa. D. & C. 556 (C.P. 1947). For the subsequent course of
litigation in Clark, see 28 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd inen., 261 App. Div.
1086, 28 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1941), aff'd inem., 287 N.Y. 833, 41 N.E.2d 102 (1942)
(specific performance denied; damages granted).
107.g, Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486 (1897) (all stockholders
ratified, not signed; specific performance allowed) ; Harris v. Magrill, 131 Misc. 380,
226 N.Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Heller v. Clark Merchandisers, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d
106, 108, 154 N.Y.S.2d 150, 153 (Sup. Ct 1955) (dictum).
108 Lockley v. Robie, 301 N.Y. 371, 93 N.E.2d 895 (1950). Baran v. Baran, 59
Pa. D. & C. 556 (C.P. 1947), may be in accord. The uncertainty is due to the fact
that the opening sentence states that holders of 95% of the stock were involved, but
the court later insists that all of the stockholders were parties.
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Regardless of the number of shares held by the contract signatories,
the reasons against the granting of specific enforcement of executive employment contracts with corporations 109 are equally valid when those
agreements are consummated with the shareholders. The officer has-or
should have-an adequate damage remedy in a suit for breach of the contract. Perhaps in the closely held corporation even more than the widely
held corporation, an unhappy marriage in management can have dire
results.110
THE LAW TODAY: SUMIMATION AND EVALUATION

Although many factors-statutes, corporate charters and bylaws, parties to the contracts, terms of the contracts, and notions of public policywill have an impact on executive removal cases as they come before the
courts, it is possible to make the following summary of present-day treatment of contracts purporting to employ an executive officer for a fixed
term:
(1) Removal with cause: The contract will not in any event give rise
to liability where adequate cause for removal can be shown.
(2) Reasonableness of the contract: The court will examine the terms
of the contract in the light of all the surrounding circumstances and will
allow an action upon it only if it is reasonable and entered into in the good
faith belief that it will serve the best interests of the corporation.
(3) Statutes authorizing removal: In the twenty-three jurisdictions
which provide by statute that an officer may be removed whenever the best
interests of the corporation will be served thereby, but that such removal
shall be without prejudice to the officer's contract rights, a reasonable contract of employment will give rise to contract damages in the event the
officer is removed without cause.
(4) Other jurisdictions: Even in the two jurisdictions which expressly provide by statute that officers may be removed at the pleasure of
the directors, a contract of employment will be enforced in an action for its
breach without cause, subject to the considerations set forth in paragraph
109 See notes 54-72 supra and accompanying text.

110 This condemnation includes specific enforcement by the Staklinski device of
previous arbitration, which also negates the directors' statutory power to remove
and manage. See notes 68-72 supra and accompanying text. It is worthy of note that
a unanimity agreement, pursuant to N.Y. SToctc CoRI'. LAw § 9, in the contract may
be effective in preventing removal by arbitration. The issue of whether an officerdirector should be removed was held not arbitrable in In the Matter of Burkin,
1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862, 154 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956); the justiciable, and hence
arbitrable, issue could not be reached inasmuch as the prerequisite removal by shareholders or directors was foreclosed by the unanimity agreement. See Katcher v.
Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (Super. Ct. 1953). Otherwise, it appears that
arbitration to determine the validity of a removal is available. In the Matter of
Landersman, 280 App. Div. 963, 116 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1952); Martocci v. Martocci,
2 Misc. 2d 330, 42 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 266 App. Div. 840, 43
N.Y.S.2d 516 (1943).
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(5) below. In the remaining jurisdictions, whose statutes are silent as to
removal, a contract will be similarly enforced, again subject to paragraph
(5). And in these "silent" jurisdictions, the presence of a legislative command that the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by its
directors will not preclude recovery.
(5) Corporate chartersand bylaws: Where the statutes are silent on
the validity of employment contracts or on the matter of recovery of damages for breach thereof, but do empower employment or election of officers
on such terms as are not prohibited by the charter or bylaws, an express
withdrawal of or self-limitation upon the power to make officers' employment contracts will preclude liability for breach of unauthorized agreements.
(6) Shareholder contracts: Courts will award damages for breach of
employment contracts involving all shareholders, but those in which only
a majority of the stockholders participate are usually unenforceable.
(7) Specific enforcement: Subject to paragraph (8) below, a contract
of employment made with the corporation will not be specifically enforced.
The officer will be left to his remedy of damages. But where all-and
possibly where only a majority-of the stockholders are participants, the
contract may be specifically enforced, provided that it is reasonable and
that the removal was attempted without cause.
(8) Arbitration: Where the contract provides that disputes arising
therefrom will be submitted to arbitration, and the rules governing the
arbitrators allow the award of specific performance, if the issue is justiciable,
a court may order compliance with the arbitrators' award of the equitable
remedy.
The law has taken great strides toward providing adequate protection
for the corporate executive who is removed unjustifiably. But there still
remain areas in which advances can be made, without hampering corporate freedom of action and within the relevant statutory framework.
Aside from those cases involving charters or bylaws which expressly limit
tenure or preclude term contracts, a reasonable contract of employment
for a fixed term-whether with the corporation, all the stockholders, or a
majority of the stockholders-should be enforceable in an action for breach
by removal without cause. Where the corporate bylaws provide that
directors have the power to amend bylaws, contract damages ought not to
be denied on the ground that a bylaw limits tenure or prohibits contracts
for fixed terms; rather, the contract should be treated as amending the
bylaw.
In contrast to the sound bases for allowing damage actions, the growing tendency of the courts to grant or affirm an award of specific performance passes the limits of necessity and freezes one facet of corporate
management in the past tense, regardless of the present state of mind of
the directors. In so doing, the trend plays at cross purposes with those
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statutes which purportedly grant removal and managerial powers to the
board. A corporation should not be compelled to retain as one of its
officers a person whose service to the corporation is no longer considered
desirable, even though his conduct may not give rise to a valid removal
for cause.

S.S.

